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    Savage Divine Myths

    The origin of a belief in GOD beyond the ken of history and of
    speculation--Sketch of conjectural theories--Two elements in all
    beliefs, whether of backward or civilised races--The Mythical and
    the Religious--These may be coeval, or either may be older than the
    other--Difficulty of study--The current anthropological theory--
    Stated objections to the theory--Gods and spirits--Suggestion that
    savage religion is borrowed from Europeans--Reply to Mr. Tylor's
    arguments on this head--The morality of savages.


    "The question of the origin of a belief in Deity does not come
    within the scope of a strictly historical inquiry. No man can
    watch the idea of GOD in the making or in the beginning. We are
    acquainted with no race whose beginning does not lie far back in
    the unpenetrated past. Even on the hypothesis that the natives of
    Australia, for example, were discovered in a state of culture more
    backward than that of other known races, yet the institutions and
    ideas of the Australians must have required for their development
    an incalculable series of centuries. The notions of man about the
    Deity, man's religious sentiments and his mythical narratives, must
    be taken as we find them. There have been, and are, many theories
    as to the origin of the conception of a supernatural being or
    beings, concerned with the fortunes of mankind, and once active in
    the making of the earth and its inhabitants. There is the
    hypothesis of an original divine tradition, darkened by the smoke
    of foolish mortal fancies. There is the hypothesis of an innate
    and intuitive sensus numinis. There is the opinion that the notion
    of Deity was introduced to man by the very nature of his knowledge
    and perceptions, which compel him in all things to recognise a
    finite and an infinite. There is the hypothesis that gods were
    originally ghosts, the magnified shapes of ancestral spectres.
    There is the doctrine that man, seeking in his early speculations
    for the causes of things, and conscious of his own powers as an
    active cause, projected his own shadow on the mists of the unknown,
    and peopled the void with figures of magnified non-natural men, his
    own parents and protectors, and the makers of many of the things in
    the world.

    "Since the actual truth cannot be determined by observation and
    experiment, the question as to the first germs of the divine
    conception must here be left unanswered. But it is possible to
    disengage and examine apart the two chief elements in the earliest
    as in the latest ideas of Godhead. Among the lowest and most
    backward, as among the most advanced races, there coexist the
    MYTHICAL and the RELIGIOUS elements in belief. The rational factor
    (or what approves itself to us as the rational factor) is visible
    in religion; the irrational is prominent in myth. The Australian,
    the Bushman, the Solomon Islander, in hours of danger and necessity
    'yearns after the gods,' and has present in his heart the idea of a
    father and friend. This is the religious element. The same man,
    when he comes to indulge his fancy for fiction, will degrade this
    spiritual friend and father to the level of the beasts, and will
    make him the hero of comic or repulsive adventures. This is the
    mythical or irrational element. Religion, in its moral aspect,
    always traces back to the belief in a power that is benign and
    works for righteousness. Myth, even in Homer or the Rig-Veda,
    perpetually falls back on the old stock of absurd and immoral
    divine adventures.[1]


    [1] M. Knappert here, in a note to the Dutch translation, denies
    the lowest mythical element to the Hebrews, as their documents have
    reached us.


    "It would be rash, in the present state of knowledge, to pronounce
    that the germ of the serious Homeric sense of the justice and power
    of the Divinity is earlier or later than the germ of the Homeric
    stories of gods disguised as animals, or imprisoned by mortals, or
    kicked out of Olympus. The rational and irrational aspects of
    mythology and religion may be of coeval antiquity for all that is
    certainly known, or either of them, in the dark backward of mortal
    experience, may have preceded the other. There is probably no
    religion nor mythology which does not offer both aspects to the
    student. But it is the part of advancing civilisation to adorn and
    purify the rational element, and to subordinate and supersede the
    irrational element, as far as religious conservatism, ritual and
    priestly dogma will permit."

    Such were the general remarks with which this chapter opened in the
    original edition of the present work. But reading, reflection and
    certain additions to the author's knowledge of facts, have made it
    seem advisable to state, more fully and forcibly than before, that,
    in his opinion, not only the puzzling element of myth, but the
    purer element of a religious belief sanctioning morality is derived
    by civilised people from a remote past of savagery. It is also
    necessary to draw attention to a singular religious phenomena, a
    break, or "fault," as geologists call it, in the religious strata.
    While the most backward savages, in certain cases, present the
    conception of a Being who sanctions ethics, and while that
    conception recurs at a given stage of civilisation, it appears to
    fade, or even to disappear in some conditions of barbarism. Among
    some barbaric peoples, such as the Zulus, and the Red Indians of
    French Canada when first observed, as among some Polynesians and
    some tribes of Western and Central Africa little trace of a supreme
    being is found, except a name, and that name is even occasionally a
    matter of ridicule. The highest religious conception has been
    reached, and is generally known, yet the Being conceived of as
    creative is utterly neglected, while ghosts, or minor gods, are
    served and adored. To this religious phenomenon (if correctly
    observed) we must attempt to assign a cause. For this purpose it
    is necessary to state again what may be called the current or
    popular anthropological theory of the evolution of Gods.

    That theory takes varying shapes. In the philosophy of Mr. Herbert
    Spencer we find a pure Euhemerism. Gods are but ghosts of dead
    men, raised to a higher and finally to the highest power. In the
    somewhat analogous but not identical system of Mr. Tylor, man first
    attains to the idea of spirit by reflection on various physical,
    psychological and psychical experiences, such as sleep, dreams,
    trances, shadows, hallucinations, breath and death, and he
    gradually extends the conception of soul or ghost till all nature
    is peopled with spirits. Of these spirits one is finally promoted
    to supremacy, where the conception of a supreme being occurs. In
    the lowest faiths there is said, on this theory, to be no
    connection, or very little connection, between religion and
    morality. To supply a religious sanction of morals is the work of
    advancing thought.[1]


    [1] Prim. Cult., ii. 381. Huxley's Science and Hebrew Tradition,
    pp. 346,372.


    This current hypothesis is, confessedly, "animistic," in Mr.
    Tylor's phrase, or, in Mr. Spencer's terminology, it is "the ghost
    theory". The human soul, says Mr. Tylor, has been the model on
    which all man's ideas of spiritual beings, from "the tiniest elf"
    to "the heavenly Creator and ruler of the world, the Great Spirit,"
    have been framed.[1] Thus it has been necessary for Mr. Tylor and
    for Mr. Spencer to discover first an origin of man's idea of his
    own soul, and that supposed origin in psychological, physical and
    psychical experiences is no doubt adequate. By reflection on these
    facts, probably, the idea of spirit was reached, though the
    psychical experiences enumerated by Mr. Tylor may contain points as
    yet unexplained by Materialism. From these sources are derived all
    really "animistic" gods, all that from the first partake of the
    nature of hungry ghosts, placated by sacrifices of food, though in
    certain cases that hunger may have been transferred, we surmise, by
    worshippers to gods not ORIGINALLY animistic.


    [1] Prim. Cult., ii. 109


    In answer to this theory of an animistic or ghostly origin of all
    gods, it must first be observed that all gods are not necessarily,
    it would seem, of animistic origin. Among certain of the lowest
    savages, although they believe in ghosts, the animistic conception,
    the spiritual idea, is not attached to the relatively supreme being
    of their faith. He is merely a powerful BEING, unborn, and not
    subject to death. The purely metaphysical question "was he a
    ghost?" does not seem always to have been asked. Consequently
    there is no logical reason why man's idea of a Maker should not be
    prior to man's idea that there are such things as souls, ghosts and
    spirits. Therefore the animistic theory is not necessary as
    material for the "god-idea". We cannot, of course, prove that the
    "god-idea" was historically prior to the "ghost-idea," for we know
    no savages who have a god and yet are ignorant of ghosts. But we
    can show that the idea of God may exist, in germ, without
    explicitly involving the idea of spirit. Thus gods MAY be prior in
    evolution to ghosts, and therefore the animistic theory of the
    origin of gods in ghosts need not necessarily be accepted.

    In the first place, the original evolution of a god out of a ghost
    need not be conceded, because in perhaps all known savage
    theological philosophy the God, the Maker and Master, is regarded
    as a being who existed before death entered the world. Everywhere,
    practically speaking, death is looked on as a comparatively late
    intruder. He came not only after God was active, but after men and
    beasts had populated the world. Scores of myths accounting for
    this invasion of death have been collected all over the world.[1]
    Thus the relatively supreme being, or beings, of religion are
    looked on as prior to Death, therefore, not as ghosts. They are
    sometimes expressly distinguished as "original gods" from other
    gods who are secondary, being souls of chiefs. Thus all Tongan
    gods are Atua, but all Atua are not "original gods".[2] The word
    Atua, according to Mr. White, is "A-tu-a". "A" was the name given
    to the author of the universe, and signifies: "Am the unlimited in
    power," "The Conception," "the Leader," "the Beyond All". "Tua"
    means "Beyond that which is most distant," "Behind all matter," and
    "Behind every action". Clearly these conceptions are not more
    mythical (indeed A does not seem to occur in the myths), nor are
    they more involved in ghosts, than the unknown absolute of Mr.
    Herbert Spencer. Yet the word Atua denotes gods who are recognised
    as ghosts of chiefs, no less than it denotes the supreme
    existence.[3] These ideas are the metaphysical theology of a race
    considerably above the lowest level. They lend no assistance to a
    theory that A was, or was evolved out of, a human ghost, and he is
    not found in Maori MYTHOLOGY as far as our knowledge goes. But,
    among the lowest known savages, the Australians, we read that "the
    Creator was a gigantic black, once on earth, now among the stars".
    This is in Gippsland; the deities of the Fuegians and the Blackfoot
    Indians are also Beings, anthropomorphic, unborn and undying, like
    Mangarrah, the creative being of the Larrakeah tribe in Australia.
    "A very good man called Mangarrah lives in the sky. . . . He made
    everything" (blacks excepted). He never dies.[4] The Melanesian
    Vui "never were men," were "something different," and "were NOT
    ghosts". It is as a Being, not as a Spirit, that the Kurnai deity
    Munganngaur (Our Father) is described.[5] In short, though
    Europeans often speak of these divine beings of low savages as
    "spirits," it does not appear that the natives themselves advance
    here the metaphysical idea of spirit. These gods are just BEINGS,
    anthropomorphic, or (in myth and fable), very often bestial,
    "theriomorphic".[6] It is manifest that a divine being envisaged
    thus need not have been evolved out of the theory of spirits or
    ghosts, and may even have been prior to the rise of the belief in
    ghosts.


    [1] See Modern Mythology, "Myths of Origin of Death".

    [2] Mariner, ii. 127.

    [3] White, Ancient History of the Maoris, vol. i. p. 4; other views
    in Gill's Myths of the Pacific. I am not committed to Mr. White's
    opinion.

    [4] Journal Anthrop. Inst., Nov., 1894, p. 191.

    [5] Ibid., 1886, p. 313.

    [6] See Making of Religion, pp. 201-210, for a more copious
    statement.


    Again, these powerful, or omnipotent divine beings are looked on as
    guardians of morality, punishers of sin, rewarders of
    righteousness, both in this world and in a future life, in places
    where ghosts, though believed in, ARE NOT WORSHIPPED, NOR IN
    RECEIPT OF SACRIFICE, and where, great grandfathers being
    forgotten, ancestral ghosts can scarcely swell into gods. This
    occurs among Andamanese, Fuegians and Australians, therefore, among
    non-ghost-worshipping races, ghosts cannot have developed into
    deities who are not even necessarily spirits. These gods, again,
    do not receive sacrifice, and thus lack the note of descent from
    hungry food-craving ghosts. In Australia, indeed, while ghosts are
    not known to receive any offerings, "the recent custom of providing
    food for it"--the dead body of a friend--"is derided by the
    intelligent old aborigines as 'white fellow's gammon'".[1]


    [1] Dawson, Australian Aborigines, p. 51, 1881.


    The Australians possess no chiefs like "Vich Ian Vohr or
    Chingachgook" whose ghosts might be said to swell into supreme
    moral deities. "Headmen" they have, leaders of various degrees of
    authority, but no Vich Ian Vohr, no semi-sacred representative of
    the tribe.[1] Nor are the ghosts of the Headmen known to receive
    any particular posthumous attention or worship. Thus it really
    seems impossible to show proof that Australian gods grew out of
    Australian ghosts, a subject to which we shall return.


    [1] Howitt, Organisation of Australian Tribes, pp. 101-113.
    "Transactions of Royal Society of Victoria," 1889.


    Some supporters of the current theory therefore fall back on the
    hypothesis that the Australians are sadly degenerate.[1] Chiefs,
    it is argued, or kings, they once had, and the gods are surviving
    ghosts of these wholly forgotten potentates. To this we reply that
    we know not the very faintest trace of Australian degeneration.
    Sir John Lubbock and Mr. Tylor have correctly argued that the soil
    of Australia has not yet yielded so much as a fragment of native
    pottery, nor any trace of native metal work, not a vestige of stone
    buildings occurs, nor of any work beyond the present native level
    of culture, unless we reckon weirs for fish-catching. "The
    Australian boomerang," writes Mr. Tylor, "has been claimed as
    derived from some hypothetical high culture, whereas the
    transition-stages through which it is connected with the club are
    to be observed in its own country, while no civilised race
    possesses the weapon."[2]


    [1] See Prof. Menzie's History of Religion, pp. 16, 17, where a
    singular inconsistency has escaped the author.

    [2] Prim. Cult., i. 57, 67.


    Therefore the Australian, with his boomerang, represents no
    degeneration but advance on his ancestors, who had not yet
    developed the boomerang out of the club. If the excessively
    complex nature of Australian rules of prohibited degrees be
    appealed to as proof of degeneration from the stage in which they
    were evolved, we reply that civilisation everywhere tends not to
    complicate but to simplify such rules, as it also notoriously
    simplifies the forms of language.

    The Australian people, when discovered, were only emerging from
    palaeolithic culture, while the neighbouring Tasmanians were
    frankly palaeolithic.[1] Far from degenerating, the Australians
    show advance when they supersede their beast or other totem by an
    eponymous human hero.[2] The eponymous hero, however, changed with
    each generation, so that no one name was fixed as that of tribal
    father, later perhaps to become a tribal god. We find several
    tribes in which the children now follow the FATHER'S class, and
    thus paternal kin takes the place of the usual early savage method
    of reckoning kinship by the mother's side, elsewhere prevalent in
    Australia. In one of these tribes, dwelling between the Glenelg
    and Mount Napier, headmanship is hereditary, but nothing is said of
    any worship of the ghosts of chiefs. All this social improvement
    denotes advance on the usual Australian standard.[3] Of
    degeneration (except when produced recently by European vices and
    diseases) I know no trace in Australia. Their highest religious
    conceptions, therefore, are not to be disposed of as survivals of a
    religion of the ghosts of such chiefs as the Australians are not
    shown ever to have recognised. The "God idea" in Australia, or
    among the Andamanese, must have some other source than the Ghost-
    Theory. This is all the more obvious because not only are ghosts
    not worshipped by the Australians, but also the divine beings who
    are alleged to form links between the ghost and the moral god are
    absent. There are no departmental gods, as of war, peace, the
    chase, love, and so forth. Sun, sky and earth are equally
    unworshipped. There is nothing in religion between a Being, on one
    hand (with a son or sons), and vague mischievous spirits, boilyas
    or mrarts, and ghosts (who are not worshipped), on the other hand.
    The friends of the idea that the God is an ancient evolution from
    the ghost of such a chief as is not proved to have existed, must
    apparently believe that the intermediate stages in religious
    evolution, departmental gods, nature gods and gods of polytheism in
    general once existed in Australia, and have all been swept away in
    a deluge of degeneration. That deluge left in religion a moral,
    potently active Father and Judge. Now that conception is
    considerably above the obsolescent belief in an otiose god which is
    usually found among barbaric races of the type from which the
    Australians are said to have degenerated. There is no proof of
    degeneracy, and, if degeneration has occurred, why has it left just
    the kind of deity who, in the higher barbaric culture, is not
    commonly found? Clearly this attempt to explain the highest aspect
    of Australian religion by an undemonstrated degeneration is an
    effort of despair.


    [1] Tylor, preface to Ling Roth's Aborigines of Tasmania, pp. v.-
    viii.

    [2] Kamilaroi and Kurnai, p. 231.

    [3] Kamilaroi and Kurnai, pp. 277, 278.


    While the current theory thus appears to break down over the
    deities of certain Australian tribes and of other low savages to be
    more particularly described later, it is not more successful in
    dealing with what we have called the "fault" or break in the
    religious strata of higher races. The nature of that "fault" may
    thus be described: While the deities of several low savage peoples
    are religiously regarded as guardians and judges of conduct both in
    this life and in the next, among higher barbarians they are often
    little, or not at all, interested in conduct. Again, while among
    Australians, and Andamanese, and Fuegians, there is hardly a
    verifiable trace, if any trace there be, of sacrifice to any divine
    being, among barbarians the gods beneath the very highest are in
    receipt even of human sacrifice. Even among barbarians the highest
    deity is very rarely worshipped with sacrifice. Through various
    degrees he is found to lose all claim on worship, and even to
    become a mere name, and finally a jest and a mockery. Meanwhile
    ancestral ghosts, and gods framed on the same lines as ghosts,
    receive sacrifice of food and of human victims. Once more, the
    high gods of low savages are not localised, not confined to any
    temple or region. But the gods of higher barbarians (the gods
    beneath the highest), are localised in this way, as occasionally
    even the highest god also is.

    All this shows that, among advancing barbarians, the gods, if they
    started from the estate of gods among savages on the lowest level,
    become demoralised, limited, conditioned, relegated to an otiose
    condition, and finally deposed, till progressive civilisation, as
    in Greece, reinstates or invents purer and more philosophic
    conceptions, without being able to abolish popular and priestly
    myth and ritual.

    Here, then, is a flaw or break in the strata of religion. What was
    the cause of this flaw? We answer, the evolution, through ghosts,
    of "animistic" gods who retained the hunger and selfishness of
    these ancestral spirits whom the lowest savages are not known to
    worship.

    The moral divine beings of these lowest races, beings (when
    religiously regarded) unconditioned, in need of no gift that man
    can give, are not to be won by offerings of food and blood. Of
    such offerings ghosts, and gods modelled on ghosts, are notoriously
    in need. Strengthened and propitiated by blood and sacrifice (not
    offered to the gods of low savages), the animistic deities will
    become partisans of their adorers, and will either pay no regard to
    the morals of their worshippers, or will be easily bribed to
    forgive sins. Here then is, ethically speaking, a flaw in the
    strata of religion, a flaw found in the creeds of ghost-worshipping
    barbarians, but not of non-ghost-worshipping savages. A crowd of
    venal, easy-going, serviceable deities has now been evolved out of
    ghosts, and Animism is on its way to supplant or overlay a rude
    early form of theism. Granting the facts, we fail to see how they
    are explained by the current theory which makes the highest god the
    latest in evolution from a ghost. That theory wrecks itself again
    on the circumstance that, whereas the tribal or national highest
    divine being, as latest in evolution, ought to be the most potent,
    he is, in fact, among barbaric races, usually the most disregarded.
    A new idea, of course, is not necessarily a powerful or fashionable
    idea. It may be regarded as a "fad," or a heresy, or a low form of
    dissent. But, when universally known to and accepted by a tribe or
    people, then it must be deemed likely to possess great influence.
    But that is not the case; and among barbaric tribes the most
    advanced conception of deity is the least regarded, the most
    obsolete.

    An excellent instance of the difference between the theory here
    advocated, and that generally held by anthropologists, may be found
    in Mr. Abercromby's valuable work, Pre- and Proto-Historic Finns,
    i. 150-154. The gods, and other early ideas, says Mr. Abercromby,
    "could in no sense be considered as supernatural". We shall give
    examples of gods among the races "nearest the beginning," whose
    attributes of power and knowledge can not, by us at least, be
    considered other than "supernatural". "The gods" (in this
    hypothesis) "were so human that they could be forced to act in
    accordance with the wishes of their worshippers, and could likewise
    be punished." These ideas, to an Australian black, or an
    Andamanese, would seem dangerously blasphemous. These older gods
    "resided chiefly in trees, wells, rivers and animals". But many
    gods of our lowest known savages live "beyond the sky". Mr.
    Abercromby supposes the sky god to be of later evolution, and to be
    worshipped after man had exhausted "the helpers that seemed nearest
    at hand . . . in the trees and waters at his very door". Now the
    Australian black has not a door, nor has he gods of any service to
    him in the "trees and waters," though sprites may lurk in such
    places for mischief. But in Mr. Abercromby's view, some men turned
    at last to the sky-god, "who in time would gain a large circle of
    worshippers". He would come to be thought omnipotent, omniscient,
    the Creator. This notion, says Mr. Abercromby, "must, if this view
    is correct, be of late origin". But the view is not correct. The
    far-seeing powerful Maker beyond the sky is found among the very
    backward races who have not developed helpers nearer man, dwelling
    round what would be his door, if door he was civilised enough to
    possess. Such near neighbouring gods, of human needs, capable of
    being bullied, or propitiated by sacrifice, are found in races
    higher than the lowest, who, for their easily procurable aid, have
    allowed the Maker to sink into an otiose god, or a mere name. Mr.
    Abercromby unconsciously proves our case by quoting the example of
    a Samoyede. This man knew a Sky-god, Num; that conception was
    familiar to him. He also knew a familiar spirit. On Mr.
    Abercromby's theory he should have resorted for help to the Sky-
    god, not to the sprite. But he did the reverse: he said, "I cannot
    approach Num, he is too far away; if I could reach him I should not
    beseech thee (the familiar spirit), but should go myself; but I
    cannot". For this precise reason, people who have developed the
    belief in accessible affable spirits go to them, with a spell to
    constrain, or a gift to bribe, and neglect, in some cases almost
    forget, their Maker. But He is worshipped by low savages, who do
    not propitiate ghosts and who have no gods in wells and trees,
    close at hand. It seems an obvious inference that the greater God
    is the earlier evolved.

    These are among the difficulties of the current anthropological
    theory. There is, however, a solution by which the weakness of the
    divine conception, its neglected, disused aspect among barbaric
    races, might be explained by anthropologists, without regarding it
    as an obsolescent form of a very early idea. This solution is
    therefore in common use. It is applied to the deity revealed in
    the ancient mysteries of the Australians, and it is employed in
    American and African instances.

    The custom is to say that the highest divine being of American or
    African native peoples has been borrowed from Europeans, and is,
    especially, a savage refraction from the God of missionaries. If
    this can be proved, the shadowy, practically powerless "Master of
    Life" of certain barbaric peoples, will have degenerated from the
    Christian conception, because of that conception he will be only a
    faint unsuccessful refraction. He has been introduced by
    Europeans, it is argued, but is not in harmony with his new
    environment, and so is "half-remembered and half forgot".

    The hypothesis of borrowing admits of only one answer, but that
    answer should be conclusive. If we can discover, say in North
    America, a single instance in which the supreme being occurs, while
    yet he cannot possibly be accounted for by any traceable or
    verifiable foreign influence, then the burden of proof, in other
    cases, falls on the opponent. When he urges that other North
    American supreme beings were borrowed, we can reply that our
    crucial example shows that this need not be the fact. To prove
    that it is the fact, in his instances, is then his business. It is
    obvious that for information on this subject we must go to the
    reports of the earliest travellers who knew the Red Indians well.
    We must try to get at gods behind any known missionary efforts.
    Mr. Tylor offers us the testimony of Heriot, about 1586, that the
    natives of Virginia believed in many gods, also in one chief god,
    "who first made other principal gods, and then the sun, moon and
    stars as petty gods".[1] Whence could the natives of Virginia have
    borrowed this notion of a Creator before 1586? If it is replied,
    in the usual way, that they developed him upwards out of sun, moon
    and star gods, other principal gods, and finally reached the idea
    of the Creator, we answer that the idea of the Maker is found where
    these alleged intermediate stages are NOT found, as in Australia.
    In Virginia then, as in Victoria, a Creator may have been evolved
    in some other way than that of gradual ascent from ghosts, and may
    have been, as in Australia and elsewhere, prior to verifiable
    ghost-worship. Again, in Virginia at our first settlement, the
    native priests strenuously resisted the introduction of Christianity.
    They were content with their deity, Ahone, "the great God who
    governs all the world, and makes the sun to shine, creating the moon
    and stars his companions. . . . The good and peaceable God . . .
    needs not to be sacrificed unto, for he intendeth all good unto
    them." This good Creator, without sacrifice, among a settled
    agricultural barbaric race sacrificing to other gods and ghosts,
    manifestly cannot be borrowed from the newly arrived religion of
    Christianity, which his priests, according to the observer,
    vigorously resisted. Ahone had a subordinate deity, magisterial in
    functions, "looking into all men's actions" and punishing the same,
    when evil. To THIS god sacrifices WERE made, and if his name,
    Okeus, is derived from Oki = "spirit," he was, of course, an
    animistic ghost-evolved deity. Anthropological writers, by an
    oversight, have dwelt on Oki, but have not mentioned Ahone.[2]
    Manifestly it is not possible to insist that these Virginian high
    deities were borrowed, without saying whence and when they were
    borrowed by a barbaric race which was, at the same time, rejecting
    Christian teaching.


    [1] Prim. Cult., ii. 341.

    [2] History of Travaile into Virginia, by William Strachey, 1612.


    Mr. Tylor writes, with his habitual perspicacity: "It is the
    widespread belief in the Great Spirit, whatever his precise nature
    and origin, that has long and deservedly drawn the attention of
    European thinkers to the native religions of the North American
    tribes". Now while, in recent times, Christian ideas may
    undeniably have crystallised round "the Great Spirit," it has come
    to be thought "that THE WHOLE DOCTRINE of the Great Spirit was
    borrowed by the savages from missionaries and colonists. But this
    view will not bear examination," says Mr. Tylor.[1]


    [1] Prim. Cult, ii. pp. 339, 340 (1873). For some reason, Mr.
    Tylor modifies this passage in 1891.


    Mr. Tylor proceeds to prove this by examples from Greenland, and
    the Algonkins. He instances the Massachusett God, Kiehtan, who
    created the other gods, and receives the just into heaven. This
    was recorded in 1622, but the belief, says Winslow, our authority,
    goes back into the unknown past. "They never saw Kiehtan, but THEY
    HOLD IT A GREAT CHARGE AND DUTY THAT ONE AGE TEACH ANOTHER." How
    could a deity thus rooted in a traditional past be borrowed from
    recent English settlers?

    In these cases the hypothesis of borrowing breaks down, and still
    more does it break down over the Algonkin deity Atahocan.

    Father Le Jeune, S.J., went first among the Algonkins, a missionary
    pioneer, in 1633, and suffered unspeakable things in his courageous
    endeavour to win souls in a most recalcitrant flock. He writes
    (1633): "As this savage has given me occasion to speak of their
    god, I will remark that it is a great error to think that the
    savages have no knowledge of any deity. I was surprised to hear
    this in France. I do not know their secrets, but, from the little
    which I am about to tell, it will be seen that they have such
    knowledge.

    "They say that one exists whom they call Atahocan, who made the
    whole. Speaking of God in a wigwam one day, they asked me 'what is
    God?' I told them that it was He who made all things, Heaven and
    Earth. They then began to cry out to each other, 'Atahocan!
    Atahocan! it is Atahocan!'"

    There could be no better evidence that Atahocan was NOT (as is
    often said) "borrowed from the Jesuits". The Jesuits had only just
    arrived.

    Later (1634) Le Jeune interrogated an old man and a partly
    Europeanised sorcerer. They replied that nothing was certain; that
    Atahocan was only spoken of as "of a thing so remote," that
    assurance was impossible. "In fact, their word Nitatohokan means,
    'I fable, I tell an old story'."

    Thus Atahocan, though at once recognised as identical with the
    Creator of the missionary, was so far from being the latest thing
    in religious evolution that he had passed into a proverb for the
    ancient and the fabulous. This, of course, is inconsistent with
    RECENT borrowing. He was neglected for Khichikouai, spirits which
    inspire seers, and are of some practical use, receiving rewards in
    offerings of grease, says Le Jeune.[1]


    [1] Relations, 1633, 1634.


    The obsolescent Atahocan seems to have had no moral activity. But,
    in America, this indolence of God is not universal. Mr. Parkman
    indeed writes: "In the primitive Indian's conception of a God, the
    idea of moral good has no part".[1] But this is definitely
    contradicted by Heriot, Strachey, Winslow, already cited, and by
    Pere Le Jeune. The good attributes of Kiehtan and Ahone were not
    borrowed from Christianity, were matter of Indian belief before the
    English arrived. Mr. Parkman writes: "The moment the Indians began
    to contemplate the object of his faith, and sought to clothe it
    with attributes, it became finite, and commonly ridiculous". It
    did so, as usual, in MYTHOLOGY, but not in RELIGION. There is
    nothing ridiculous in what is known of Ahone and Kiehtan. If they
    had a mythology, and if we knew the myths, doubtless they would be
    ridiculous enough. The savage mind, turned from belief and awe
    into the spinning of yarns, instantly yields to humorous fancy. As
    we know, mediaeval popular Christianity, in imagery, marchen or
    tales, and art, copiously illustrates the same mental phenomenon.
    Saints, God, our Lord, and the Virgin, all play ludicrous and
    immoral parts in Christian folk-tales. This is Mythology, and here
    is, beyond all cavil, a late corruption of Religion. Here, where
    we know the history of a creed, Religion is early, and these myths
    are late. Other examples of American divine ideas might be given,
    such as the extraordinary hymns in which the Zunis address the
    Eternal, Ahonawilona. But as the Zuni religion has only been
    studied in recent years, the hymns would be dismissed as
    "borrowed," though there is nothing Catholic or Christian about
    them. We have preferred to select examples where borrowing from
    Christianity is out of the question. The current anthropological
    theory is thus confronted with American examples of ideas of the
    divine which cannot have been borrowed, while, if the gods are said
    to have been evolved out of ghosts, we reply that, in some cases,
    they receive no sacrifice, sacrifice being usually a note of
    ghostly descent. Again, similar gods, as we show, exist where
    ghosts of chiefs are not worshipped, and as far as evidence goes
    never were worshipped, because there is no evidence of the
    existence at any time of such chiefs. The American highest gods
    may then be equally free from the taint of ghostly descent.


    [1] Parkman, The Jesuits in North America. p. lxxviii.


    There is another more or less moral North American deity whose
    evolution is rather questionable. Pere Brebeuf (1636), speaking of
    the Hurons, says that "they have recourse to Heaven in almost all
    their necessities, . . . and I may say that it is, in fact, God
    whom they blindly adore, for they imagine that there is an Oki,
    that is, a demon, in heaven, who regulates the seasons, bridles the
    winds and the waves of the sea, and helps them in every need. They
    dread his wrath, and appeal to him as witness to the inviolability
    of their faith, when they make a promise or treaty of peace with
    enemies. 'Heaven hear us to-day' is their form of adjuration."[1]


    [1] Relations, 1636, pp. 106, 107.


    A spiritual being, whose home is heaven, who rides on the winds,
    whose wrath is dreaded, who sanctions the oath, is only called "a
    demon" by the prejudice of the worthy father who, at the same time,
    admits that the savages have a conception of God--and that God, so
    conceived, is this demon!

    The debatable question is, was the "demon," or the actual expanse
    of sky, first in evolution? That cannot precisely be settled, but
    in the analogous Chinese case of China we find heaven (Tien) and
    "Shang-ti, the personal ruling Deity," corresponding to the Huron
    "demon". Shang-ti, the personal deity, occurs most in the oldest,
    pre-Confucian sacred documents, and, so far, appears to be the
    earlier conception. The "demon" in Huron faith may also be earlier
    than the religious regard paid to his home, the sky.[1] The
    unborrowed antiquity of a belief in a divine being, creative and
    sometimes moral, in North America, is thus demonstrated. So far I
    had written when I accidentally fell in with Mr. Tylor's essay on
    "The Limits of Savage Religion".[2] In that essay, rather to my
    surprise, Mr. Tylor argues for the borrowing of "The Great Spirit,"
    "The Great Manitou," from the Jesuits. Now, as to the phrase,
    "Great Spirit," the Jesuits doubtless caused its promulgation, and,
    where their teaching penetrated, shreds of their doctrine may have
    adhered to the Indian conception of that divine being. But Mr.
    Tylor in his essay does not allude to the early evidence, his own,
    for Oki, Atahocan, Kiehtan, and Torngursak, all undeniably prior to
    Jesuit influence, and found where Jesuits, later, did not go. As
    Mr. Tylor offers no reason for disregarding evidence in 1892 which
    he had republished in a new edition of Primitive Culture in 1891,
    it is impossible to argue against him in this place. He went on,
    in the essay cited (1892) to contend that the Australian god of the
    Kamilaroi of Victoria, Baiame, is, in name and attributes, of
    missionary introduction. Happily this hypothesis can be refuted,
    as we show in the following chapter on Australian gods.


    [1] See Tylor, Prim. Cult., ii. 362, and Making of Religion, p.
    318; also Menzies, History of Religion, pp. 108,109, and Dr.
    Legge's Chinese Classics, in Sacred Books of the East, vols. iii.,
    xxvii., xxviii.

    [2] Journ. of Anthrop. Inst., vol. xxi., 1892.


    It would be easy enough to meet the hypothesis of borrowing in the
    case of the many African tribes who possess something approaching
    to a rude monotheistic conception. Among these are the Dinkas of
    the Upper Nile, with their neighbours, whose creed Russegger
    compares to that of modern Deists in Europe. The Dinka god,
    Dendid, is omnipotent, but so benevolent that he is not addressed
    in prayer, nor propitiated by sacrifice. Compare the supreme being
    of the Caribs, beneficent, otiose, unadored.[1] A similar deity,
    veiled in the instruction of the as yet unpenetrated Mysteries,
    exists among the Yao of Central Africa.[2] Of the negro race,
    Waitz says, "even if we do not call them monotheists, we may still
    think of them as standing on the boundary of monotheism despite
    their innumerable rude superstitions".[3] The Tshi speaking people
    of the Gold Coast have their unworshipped Nyankupon, a now otiose
    unadored being, with a magisterial deputy, worshipped with many
    sacrifices. The case is almost an exact parallel to that of Ahone
    and Oki in America. THESE were not borrowed, and the author has
    argued at length against Major Ellis's theory of the borrowing from
    Christians of Nyankupon.[4]


    [1] Rochefort, Les Isles Antilles, p. 415. Tylor, ii. 337.

    [2] Macdonald, Africana, 1, 71, 72, 130, 279-301. Scott,
    Dictionary of the Manganja Language, Making of Religion, pp. 230-
    238. A contradictory view in Spencer, Ecclesiastical Institutions,
    p. 681.

    [3] Anthropologie, ii. 167.

    [4] Making of Religion, pp. 243-250.


    To conclude this chapter, the study of savage and barbaric
    religions seems to yield the following facts:--

    1. Low savages. No regular chiefs. Great beings, not in receipt
    of sacrifice, sanctioning morality. Ghosts are not worshipped,
    though believed in. Polytheism, departmental gods and gods of
    heaven, earth, sky and so forth, have not been developed or are not
    found.

    2. Barbaric races. Aristocratic or monarchic. Ghosts are
    worshipped and receive sacrifice. Polytheistic gods are in renown
    and receive sacrifice. There is usually a supreme Maker who is, in
    some cases, moral, in others otiose. In only one or two known
    cases (as in that of the Polynesian Taaroa) is he in receipt of
    sacrifice.

    3. Barbaric races. (Zulus, monarchic with Unkulunkulu; some
    Algonquins (feebly aristocratic) with Atahocan). Religion is
    mainly ancestor worship or vague spirit worship; ghosts are
    propitiated with food. There are traces of an original divine
    being whose name is becoming obsolescent and a matter of jest.

    4. Early civilisations. Monarchic or aristocratic. (Greece,
    Egypt, India, Peru, Mexico.) Polytheism. One god tends to be
    supreme. Religiously regarded, gods are moral; in myth are the
    reverse. Gods are in receipt of sacrifice. Heavenly society is
    modelled on that of men, monarchic or aristocratic. Philosophic
    thought tends towards belief in one pure god, who may be named
    Zeus, in Greece.

    5. The religion of Israel. Probably a revival and purification of
    the old conception of a moral, beneficent creator, whose creed had
    been involved in sacrifice and anthropomorphic myth.

    In all the stages thus roughly sketched, myths of the lowest sort
    prevail, except in the records of the last stage, where the
    documents have been edited by earnest monotheists.

    If this theory be approximately correct, man's earliest religious
    ideas may very well have consisted, in a sense, of dependence on a
    supreme moral being who, when attempts were made by savages to
    describe the modus of his working, became involved in the fancies
    of mythology. How this belief in such a being arose we have no
    evidence to prove. We make no hint at a sensus numinis, or direct
    revelation.

    While offering no hypothesis of the origin of belief in a moral
    creator we may present a suggestion. Mr. Darwin says about early
    man: "The same high mental faculties which first led man to believe
    in unseen spiritual agencies, then in fetichism, polytheism and
    ultimately monotheism, would infallibly lead him, so long as his
    reasoning powers remained poorly developed, to various strange
    superstitions and customs".[1] Now, accepting Mr. Darwin's theory
    that early man had "high mental faculties," the conception of a
    Maker of things does not seem beyond his grasp. Man himself made
    plenty of things, and could probably conceive of a being who made
    the world and the objects in it. "Certainly there must be some
    Being who made all these things. He must be very good too," said
    an Eskimo to a missionary.[2] The goodness is inferred by the
    Eskimo from his own contentment with "the things which are made".[3]


    [1] Darwin, Descent of Man, i. p. 66.

    [2] Cranz, i. 199.

    [3] Romans, i. 19.


    Another example of barbaric man "seeking after God" may be adduced.

    What the Greenlander said is corroborated by what a Kaffir said.
    Kaffir religion is mainly animistic, ancestral spirits receive food
    and sacrifice--there is but an evanescent tradition of a "Lord in
    Heaven". Thus a very respectable Kaffir said to M. Arbrousset,
    "your tidings (Christianity) are what I want; and I was seeking
    before I knew you. . . . I asked myself sorrowful questions. 'Who
    has touched the stars with his hands? . . . Who makes the waters
    flow? . . . Who can have given earth the wisdom and power to
    produce corn?' Then I buried my face in my hands."

    "This," says Sir John Lubbock, "was, however, an exceptional case.
    As a general rule savages do not set themselves to think out such
    questions."[1]


    [1] Origin of Civilisation, p. 201.


    As a common fact, if savages never ask the question, at all events,
    somehow, they have the answer ready made. "Mangarrah, or Baiame,
    Puluga, or Dendid, or Ahone, or Ahonawilona, or Atahocan, or
    Taaroa, or Tui Laga, was the maker." Therefore savages who know
    that leave the question alone, or add mythical accretions. But
    their ancestors must have asked the question, like the "very
    respectable Kaffir" before they answered it.

    Having reached the idea of a Creator, it was not difficult to add
    that he was "good," or beneficent, and was deathless.

    A notion of a good powerful Maker, not subject to death because
    necessarily prior to Death (who only invaded the world late), seems
    easier of attainment than the notion of Spirit which, ex hypothesi,
    demands much delicate psychological study and hard thought. The
    idea of a Good Maker, once reached, becomes, perhaps, the germ of
    future theism, but, as Mr. Darwin says, the human mind was
    "infallibly led to various strange superstitions". As St. Paul
    says, in perfect agreement with Mr. Darwin on this point, "they
    became vain in their imaginations, and their foolish heart was
    darkened".

    Among other imaginations (right or wrong) was the belief in
    spirits, with all that followed in the way of instituting
    sacrifices, even of human beings, and of dropping morality, about
    which the ghost of a deceased medicine-man was not likely to be
    much interested. The supposed nearness to man, and the venal and
    partial character of worshipped gods and ghost-gods, would
    inevitably win for them more service and attention than would be
    paid to a Maker remote, unbought and impartial. Hence the
    conception of such a Being would tend to obsolescence, as we see
    that it does, and would be most obscured where ghosts were most
    propitiated, as among the Zulus. Later philosophy would attach the
    spiritual conception to the revived or newly discovered idea of the
    supreme God.

    In all this speculation there is nothing mystical; no supernatural
    or supernormal interference is postulated. Supernormal experiences
    may have helped to originate or support the belief in spirits,
    that, however, is another question. But this hypothesis of the
    origin of belief in a good unceasing Maker of things is, of course,
    confessedly a conjecture, for which historical evidence cannot be
    given, in the nature of the case. All our attempts to discover
    origins far behind history must be conjectural. Their value must
    be estimated by the extent to which this or that hypothesis
    colligates the facts. Now our hypothesis does colligate the facts.
    It shows how belief in a moral supreme being might arise before
    ghosts were worshipped, and it accounts for the flaw in the
    religious strata, for the mythical accretions, for the otiose
    Creator in the background of many barbaric religions, and for the
    almost universal absence of sacrifice to the God relatively
    supreme. He was, from his earliest conception, in no need of gifts
    from men.

    On this matter of otiose supreme gods, Professor Menzies writes,
    "It is very common to find in savage beliefs a vague far-off god,
    who is at the back of all the others, takes little part in the
    management of things, and receives little worship. But it is
    impossible to judge what that being was at an earlier time; he may
    have been a nature god, or a spirit who has by degrees grown faint,
    and come to occupy this position."

    Now the position which he occupies is usually, if not universally,
    that of the Creator. He could not arrive at this rank by "becoming
    faint," nor could "a nature-god" be the Maker of Nature. The only
    way by which we can discover "what that being was at an earlier
    time" is to see what he IS at an earlier time, that is to say, what
    the conception of him is, among men in an earlier state of culture.
    Among them, as we show, he is very much more near, potent and
    moral, than among races more advanced in social evolution and
    material culture. We can form no opinion as to the nature of such
    "vague, far-off gods, at the back of all the others," till we
    collect and compare examples, and endeavour to ascertain what
    points they have in common, and in what points they differ from
    each other. It then becomes plain that they are least far away,
    and most potent, where there is least ghostly and polytheistic
    competition, that is, among the most backward races. The more
    animism the less theism, is the general rule. Manifestly the
    current hypothesis--that all religion is animistic in origin--does
    not account for these facts, and is obliged to fly to an
    undemonstrated theory of degradation, or to an undemonstrated
    theory of borrowing. That our theory is inconsistent with the
    general doctrine of evolution we cannot admit, if we are allowed to
    agree with Mr. Darwin's statement about the high mental faculties
    which first led man to sympathetic, and then to wild beliefs. We
    do not pretend to be more Darwinian than Mr. Darwin, who compares
    "these miserable and indirect results of our higher faculties" to
    "the occasional mistakes of the instincts of the lower animals".

    The opinion here maintained, namely, that a germ of pure belief may
    be detected amidst the confusion of low savage faith, and that in a
    still earlier stage it may have been less overlaid with fable, is
    in direct contradiction to current theories. It is also in
    contradiction with the opinions entertained by myself before I made
    an independent examination of the evidence. Like others, I was
    inclined to regard reports of a moral Creator, who observes
    conduct, and judges it even in the next life, as rumours due either
    to Christian influence, or to mistake. I well know, however, and
    could, and did, discount the sources of error. I was on my guard
    against the twin fallacies of describing all savage religion as
    "devil worship," and of expecting to find a primitive "divine
    tradition". I was also on my guard against the modern bias derived
    from the "ghost-theory," and Mr. Spencer's works, and I kept an eye
    on opportunities of "borrowing".[1] I had, in fact, classified all
    known idola in the first edition of this work, such as the fallacy
    of leading questions and the chance of deliberate deception. I
    sought the earliest evidence, prior to any missionary teaching, and
    the evidence of what the first missionaries found, in the way of
    belief, on their arrival. I preferred the testimony of the best
    educated observers, and of those most familiar with native
    languages. I sought for evidence in native hymns (Maori, Zuni,
    Dinka, Red Indian) and in native ceremonial and mystery, as these
    sources were least likely to be contaminated.


    [1] Making of Religion, p. 187.


    On the other side, I found a vast body of testimony that savages
    had no religion at all. But that testimony, en masse, was refuted
    by Roskoff, and also, in places, by Tylor. When three witnesses
    were brought to swear that they saw the Irishman commit a crime, he
    offered to bring a dozen witnesses who did NOT see him. Negative
    evidence of squatters, sailors and colonists, who did NOT see any
    religion among this or that race, is not worth much against
    evidence of trained observers and linguists who DID find what the
    others missed, and who found more the more they knew the tribe in
    question. Again, like others, I thought savages incapable of such
    relatively pure ideas as I now believe some of them to possess.
    But I could not resist the evidence, and I abandoned my a priori
    notions. The evidence forcibly attests gradations in the central
    belief. It is found in various shades, from relative potency down
    to a vanishing trace, and it is found in significant proportion to
    the prevalence of animistic ideas, being weakest where they are
    most developed, strongest where they are least developed. There
    must be a reason for these phenomena, and that reason, as it seems
    to me, is the overlaying and supersession of a rudely Theistic by an
    animistic creed. That one cause would explain, and does colligate,
    all the facts.

    There remains a point on which misconception proves to be possible.
    It will be shown, contrary to the current hypothesis, that the
    religion of the lowest races, in its highest form, sanctions
    morality. That morality, again, in certain instances, demands
    unselfishness. Of course we are not claiming for that doctrine any
    supernatural origin. Religion, if it sanctions ethics at all, will
    sanction those which the conscience accepts, and those ethics, in
    one way or other, must have been evolved. That the "cosmical" law
    is "the weakest must go to the wall" is generally conceded. Man,
    however, is found trying to reverse the law, by equal and friendly
    dealing (at least within what is vaguely called "the tribe"). His
    religion, as in Australia, will be shown to insist on this
    unselfishness. How did he evolve his ethics?

    "Be it little or be it much they get," says Dampier about the
    Australians in 1688, "every one has his part, as well the young and
    tender as the old and feeble, who are not able to get abroad as the
    strong and lusty." This conduct reverses the cosmical process, and
    notoriously civilised society, Christian society, does not act on
    these principles. Neither do the savages, who knock the old and
    feeble on the head, or deliberately leave them to starve, act on
    these principles, sanctioned by Australian religion, but (according
    to Mr. Dawson) NOT carried out in Australian practice. "When old
    people become infirm . . . it is lawful and customary to kill
    them."[1]


    [1] Australian Aborigines, p. 62.


    As to the point of unselfishness, evolutionists are apt to account
    for it by common interest. A tribe in which the strongest
    monopolise what is best will not survive so well as an unselfish
    tribe in the struggle for existence. But precisely the opposite is
    true, aristocracy marks the more successful barbaric races, and an
    aristocratic slave-holding tribe could have swept Australia as the
    Zulus swept South Africa. That aristocracy and acquisition of
    separate property are steps in advance on communistic savagery all
    history declares. Therefore a tribe which in Australia developed
    private property, and reduced its neighbours to slavery, would have
    been better fitted to survive than such a tribe as Dampier
    describes.

    This is so evident that probably, or possibly, the Dampier state of
    society was not developed in obedience to a recognised tribal
    interest, but in obedience to an affectionate instinct. "Ils
    s'entr' aiment les une les autres," says Brebeuf of the Hurons.[1]
    "I never heard the women complain of being left out of feasts, or
    that the men ate the best portions . . . every one does his
    business sweetly, peaceably, without dispute. You never see
    disputes, quarrels, hatred, or reproach among them." Brebeuf then
    tells how a young Indian stranger, in a time of want, stole the
    best part of a moose. "They did not rage or curse, they only
    bantered him, and yet to take our meat was almost to take our
    lives." Brebeuf wanted to lecture the lad; his Indian host bade
    him hold his peace, and the stranger was given hospitality, with
    his wife and children. "They are very generous, and make it a
    point not to attach themselves to the goods of this world." "Their
    greatest reproach is 'that man wants everything, he is greedy'.
    They support, with never a murmur, widows, orphans and old men, yet
    they kill hopeless or troublesome invalids, and their whole conduct
    to Europeans was the reverse of their domestic behaviour."


    [1] Relations, 1634, p. 29.


    Another example of savage unselfish ethics may be found in Mr.
    Mann's account of the Andaman Islanders, a nomad race, very low in
    culture. "It is a noteworthy trait, and one which deserves high
    commendation, that every care and consideration are paid by all
    classes to the very young, the weak, the aged, and the helpless,
    and these being made special objects of interest and attention,
    invariably fare better in regard to the comforts and necessaries of
    daily life than any of the otherwise more fortunate members of the
    community."[1]


    [1] J. A. I., xii. p. 93.


    Mr. Huxley, in his celebrated Romanes Lecture on "Evolution and
    Morality," laid stress on man's contravention of the cosmic law,
    "the weakest must go to the wall". He did not explain the
    evolution of man's opposition to this law. The ordinary
    evolutionist hypothesis, that the tribe would prosper most whose
    members were least self-seeking, is contradicted by all history.
    The overbearing, "grabbing," aristocratic, individualistic,
    unscrupulous races beat the others out of the field. Mr. Huxley,
    indeed, alleged that the "influence of the cosmic process in the
    evolution of society is the greater the more rudimentary its
    civilisation. Social progress means a checking of the cosmic
    process at every step and the substitution for it of another, which
    may be called the ethical process. . . . As civilisation has
    advanced, so has the extent of this interference increased. . . ."[1]
    But where, in Europe, is the interference so marked as among
    the Andamanese? We have still to face the problem of the
    generosity of low savages.


    [1] Ethics of Evolution, pp. 81-84.


    It is conceivable that the higher ethics of low savages rather
    reflect their emotional instincts than arise from tribal
    legislation which is supposed to enable a "tribe" to prosper in the
    struggle for existence. As Brebeuf and Dampier, among others,
    prove, savages often set a good example to Christians, and their
    ethics are, in certain cases, as among the Andamanese and Fuegians,
    and, probably among the Yao, sanctioned by their religion. But, as
    Mr. Tylor says, "the better savage social life seems but in
    unstable equilibrium, liable to be easily upset by a touch of
    distress, temptation, or violence".[1] Still, religion does its
    best, in certain cases, to lend equilibrium; though all the world
    over, religion often fails in practice.

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